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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG J. REECE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, and the UNIVERSITY 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19600 
BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for restitution and declaratory judgment 
that the respondents violated Craigfs rights to procedural due 
process with their policies and procedures for increasing rent 
at student family housing at the University. Also, the 
practices of using rent to finance new construction and capital 
improvements on a cash basis violates substantive due process 
and equal protection of the laws. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
Judge Sawaya, of the Third Judicial District Court, denied 
and struck the appellantfs motions for partial summary 
judgment; and granted motions for summary judgment by each 
respondent. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order reversing or vacating summary 
judgment for each respondent; an order granting each of the 
appellant's motions for partial summary judgment; a remand for 
trial on the issue of the amount of restitution to be paid to 
the appellant; and an order granting costs on appeal. In the 
alternative, appellant seeks reversal and remand for a trial on 
all issues, and his costs on appeal. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
Craig Reece is a student at the University of Utah. He and 
his family have resided in the University Village, a part of 
Student Family Housing, since August 1, 1980 (R.2). The lease 
sets rent at $244.00 per month. The lease contains a rent 
escalator clause that allows rent to be increased if utility, 
operating, or maintenance costs increase (R.273). The rent has 
been summarily increased four times to the present rate of 
$302.00 per month (R.8). Utilities are estimated from a master 
meter for the entire Village rather than actual costs from 
individual meters on each apartment (R.273, 357)• 
The Village was constructed with funds from revenue bonds 
sold by the University and the Board of Regents between 1965 
and 1979 (R.3). Other campus enterprises were also constructed 
with different bonds of the same series. All of these 
facilities comprise the Student Housing Bond System, which is 
the Village, Baliff Food Service, dormitories, Medical Plaza 
-2-
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housing for medical students, and the University Bookstore 
(R.3). This bond system is financially operated separately 
from the rest of the University. 
By law, these facilities must collect sufficient revenue so 
that the income, together with land grant interest, will pay 
the bond debt without supplemental appropriations from the 
legislature. Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-3(7) (1953 as amended). 
The policy of the Board of Regents requires the Village to also 
be self-supporting as to operating and maintenance costs 
(R.279). The exact definition of this policy was a matter of 
dispute in the trial court (R.313-14). 
Craig Reece filed suit seeking declaratory relief and a 
refund of rent because the policies, practices, and procedures 
of the respondents in increasing and spending rent are 
unconstitutional. He also challenged the construction of a 
second maintenance building--the Village already has one--with 
surplus rent (R.5). The other issues raised in the complaint 
are supplementary and will not be expressly addressed on appeal. 
Craig moved for partial summary judgment on the legality of 
the maintenance building (R.25). The respondents did not 
answer the motion and failed to appear at the hearing. The 
^Counsel for respondents had unsuccessfully attempted to 
reschedule the hearing, as explained in the affidavits (R.105, 
100, 103). In retaliation for Craigfs appearance at the 
hearing, they fabricated a story that Craig had lied to the 
judge (R.96) and filed a motion to have him held in contempt 
(R.95). They do not know what was said because they were not 
present. The motion for contempt was withdrawn without 
argument at the August 8, 1983, hearing. 
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trial court granted the motion (R.94), but did not sign an 
order to that effect (R.lll). The motion for partial summary 
judgment was rescheduled by the respondents for August 8, 1983, 
nearly two months after the motion was filed (R.286, 294). 
On July 20, 1983, the Board of Regents filed a motion to 
dismiss (R.112), and the University filed a motion for summary 
judgment (R.114) on July 21. On August 2, Craig filed requests 
for admissions and requests for the production of documents 
from each respondent (R.297-307). He also filed an affidavit 
and motion for continuance pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
(R.308, 316, 318). 
After oral argument on the motions, the judge mailed a 
minute entry granting both of the respondents1 motions and 
denying Craig's motion for partial summary judgment. (R.329). 
However, no judgment was entered because the respondents did 
not prepare one as required by Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of 
Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the State of 
Utah. Forty-five days after the requests for admission were 
filed, Craig filed a motion for partial summary judgment on all 
issues except the amount of restitution, a motion to compel the 
production of documents, additional affidavits, and the 
admissions of the respondents (R.334-61). At the hearing on 
this motion, the court refused to hear any argument 
(R.387-88). Judgment was finally entered on October 7, 1983 
(R.368). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MATTERS IN THE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ARE 
DEEMED ADMITTED FOR FAILURE TO RESPOND. 
The disposition of the unanswered requests for admission is 
important to the factual base of the issues on appeal. The 
matters in a request for admission are "admitted unless, within 
30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or 
longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection. . . . " Utah R. Civ. 
2 P. 36(a). The court did not extend the time for answering, 
nor did the respondents file an answer or objection for the 
sixty-two days between the filing of the requests and the 
hearing on the second motion for partial summary judgment. 
The respondents must either treat the facts in the requests 
as immaterial, in which case they may not complain about their 
admissions, or they must concede that it was error to grant 
summary judgment while the requests were unanswered. Any doubt 
about the existence of a material issue of fact must be 
resolved in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). 
Requests for admission may be filed at any time, even after 
^The respondents orally requested an extension of time at the 
August 8 hearing, but the request was denied by the judge. 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Pittsburg Hotels 
Assfn v. Urban Redev. Auth., 29 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Pa. 1962). 
The time to answer the admissions is not suspended by the 
pendency of a motion for summary judgment. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). The issue here is whether 
a minute entry granting summary judgment terminates discovery 
when no judgment is entered. 
A minute entry is not a judgment and does not terminate the 
proceedings in the trial court. Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 
655 (Utah 1982). It is merely a memorandum from which the 
judgment is to be entered; it does not preclude further 
proceedings. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 
414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943); Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Co., 65 
Utah 269, 236 P. 452 (1925); Robison v. Fillmore Commercial 8e 
Sav. Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 P. 790 (1923). 
Rule 2.9(a) of the R. Prac. Dist. & Cir. Courts recognizes 
the interlocutory nature of minute rulings. The prevailing 
3 
party has a maximum of fifteen days to prepare a judgment. 
Compliance with Rule 2.9 is a prerequisite to the entry of a 
final judgment. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). 
Any prejudice to the respondents is due to their 
inexcusable neglect. If the respondents did not want the 
matters admitted, they should have objected to the requests or 
moved to set the admissions aside under Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b). 
The entry of judgment also would have prevented the admissions, 
3Rules 2.9(a) and (b) are quoted in full at app. A-3. 
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but counsel for respondents made an error of law in thinking he 
il! I d riot neeiJ a judgment (R .362) The respondents s imp 1 v fal led 
to make any effort to exclude or prevent the admissions, even 
after they knew of Craig's reliant- m -he admissions* Since 
summar y j udgoienI: ,shoi lid not I: e ' ^.r ^rv requests 
are unanswered, the respondents should nor uz-jiit from a" error 
of law compounded by the! r inexcusaoie neglect. achmitt v . 
B i l l i n g s , - >• i .2d at 5] 9 
.• • /•• . . : ; ". P O I N T i r ; .; •• .. • 
THE BOARD OF REGENTS DID NOT AND COULD NOT 
DELEGATE THE DUTY TO SET RENT. 
A• The Board of Regents did not delegate the power to set rent 
to the Universitv. The sole basis of the Board's motion in 
dismiss was that the pnwei l.o tix rent lud been delegated to 
the University. Whatever authority the University once had to 
set rent was taken away and ^iven to the Board of Regents by 
the legislature. Utah Lode Ann, >i 53-48-lb (1953 as 
amended),' Only the Board nay act "on behalf of11 the 
University cu "equip, furnish, maintain, And operate such 
projects and buildings. hoi (.lie use and availability ot the 
foregoing, the board may impose and collect rents, fees, and 
charges from students "" Section Si-?^ -1 (--0 , See a I so , 
k "ji'3-38-3 {7 ) (f'lie boardl -IM^ I IX rent to pledge to the bond). .' 
The events litigated in this suit show the wi^ioni of the 
statutorv svstem of checks and ha lamps, 
^Quoted in full at app. A-2. 
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In accordance with these directives, the Board used to set 
rent. This longstanding practice was changed when the Board 
"delegated11 these duties to the University in May, 1980 
(R.278). The source for this belief is the following excerpt 
from the minutes: 
President Gardner [of the University of Utah] 
suggested that Board policy be modified to 
require Board review and approval of housing and 
food charges only in the event that student 
housing is not self-supporting from user 
charges. Regent Newey offered a motion to 
request the Commissioner to draft an amendment to 
the Board's auxiliary policy to incorporate 
President Gardner's recommendation. He 
emphasized that those institutions that are using 
other options as provided in the housing addendum 
adopted by the Board today should continue to 
submit their proposed housing and food charges to 
the Board to be subject to its approval. Regent 
Brockbank seconded and the motion was unanimously 
adopted. 
(R.279). The only directive here is for the Commissioner to 
draft the proposed rule. The board did not produce the 
requested final draft of the proposed rule (R.304). 
The Institutional Council has only those powers over Board 
responsibilities that are 'Specifically authorized and 
delegated to the council by the board of regents. . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-48-19(2). To delegate is to appoint and direct 
someone to act as the agent of the delegator. The Board simply 
decided to withhold approval, it did not direct or empower the 
institutional council to do anything. 
A delegation of authority is the making of a "rule" because 
it is a "statement of general applicability . . . that 
implements . . . the law or prescribes the policy of the agency 
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in the administration of its functions. . . •" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46-3(4) (1953 as amended). To make such a rule, the Board 
must post a public notice for five days prior to the meeting, 
§ 63-46-12(2). This notice must include a statement of the 
terms or substance of the proposed rule and the reasons for its 
adoption, § 63-46-5(1) (a) (1953 & Supp. 1983). Then, 
interested persons must be permitted to offer comments on the 
proposed rule, § 63-46-12(1). The board refused to produce the 
minutes and agendas that would establish noncompliance with 
these requirements (R.305). 
To assert that the board intended the minutes and 
resolution to be a final rulemaking is to impute an intent to 
evade the clear notice and comment requirements of the law. A 
rule is void if inadequate public notice is given. D.C. 
Transit System, Inc. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) . Rules are also void if not written and promulgated 
according to statute. Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95 
(Utah 1983). 
An agency action is also void if there is no justification 
for it in the administrative record. The court will not supply 
a reasoned basis for the action that the agency has not given. 
Mountain States Legal Found, v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 
P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981). This is especially important 
where, as here, the agency reverses its prior position. 
A "settled course of behavior embodies the 
agency's informed judgment that, by pursuing that 
course, it will carry out the policies committed 
to it by [the legislature]. There is, then, at 
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least a presumption that those policies will be 
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered 
to.n Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of 
Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1373). Accordingly, 
an agency changing its course by rescinding a 
rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis 
for the change beyond that which may be required 
when an agency does not act in the first instance. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 (1983). Post-hoc rationalizations by 
appellate counsel are unacceptable. Id. at 2870. The intended 
delegation never occurred because no such rule was properly 
promulgated. 
B. The Board cannot delegate the power to set rent. Counsel 
for the Board suggested that the power to set rent is optional 
because § 53-38-1(4) says the board "may11 set rent (R.280). 
The Board's longstanding practice of actually setting rent 
belies this interpretation. There is no statute saying the 
University may set rent. The University has only those powers 
expressly granted by the legislature. First Equity Corp. v. 
Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). The power to 
charge fees must be given in "clear, express, and unmistakable 
terms.11 Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm'n, 657 
P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1982). The board cannot create the power 
to charge fees in the University by its rules. See Utah Mfrs. 
Assfn v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 215, 23 P.2d 229, 236 (1933) 
(fees must be expressly provided by statute). 
The word "may11 is mandatory if it is the only reasonable 
interpretation of the statute. Harding v. Alpine City, 656 
P.2d 985 (Utah 1982). "May11 is also mandatory if third parties 
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are prejudiced by administrative inaction. Board of Educ. v. 
Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033-35 (Utah 1983). It is 
unlikely that the legislature intended to allow the Board to 
undo the Higher Education Act by redelegating back all of the 
powers the legislature took away. 
An agency may not completely delegate decisionmaking 
authority that requires the exercise of discretion and informed 
judgment. State Tax Comm'n v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P.2d 
120, 122-23 (1936). It may only delegate ministerial duties, 
such as factfinding duties, and other nondiscretionary 
functions. Id.; Anderson v. Grand River Dam Auth., 446 P.2d 
814, 818 (Okla. 1968). 
The interpretation and application of lease provisions to 
determine whether the conditions precedent to a rent increase 
have been satisfied, and what the new rent should be, are 
judicial functions requiring the exercise of discretion. 
Anderson v. Section 11, Inc., 626 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1981); Estwin Corp. v. Prescription Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc., 
563 P.2d 78 (Nev. 1977). See Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 986 (1978) 
(judicial interpretations of rent escalator clauses). It 
should not be a legislative act, as is utility ratemaking, 
because the contract clause in the constitution forbids a state 
from legislatively altering its own obligations under a 
contract. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 
(1977). 
If this attempted abdication of responsibility is legal, 
then what would stop the Public Service Commission from 
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delegating all of its utility ratemaking duties to its staff? 
These agencies must respect the checks and balances established 
by statute. That the Board merely wanted to divest itself of 
statutory duties is shown by the absence of any oversight of 
the Village (R•360-61). For these reasons, the rent increases 
are void because they were not approved by the Board of Regents. 
POINT III 
THE PROCEDURES USED BY THE UNIVERSITY TO INCREASE 
RENT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
The University violated due process by giving inadequate 
notice and hearing opportunities to Craig before it increased 
rent. nThe government as landlord is still the government. It 
must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is 
subject to the requirements of due process of law.11 Rudder v. 
United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955). A due process 
analysis requires a two-step inquiry. First, a property 
interest must exist, then inquiry is made into what procedures 
are required to protect that interest. State ex rel. Summers 
v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980). 
A* Craig has a property interest in the amount of rent charged 
by the University. The lease sets rent at $244.00 per month, 
with provision for increases if certain conditions are 
satisfied (R.273). Due process protects against erroneous rent 
increases that exceed the restraints in the lease. Aguiar v* 
Hawaii Hous. Auth., 522 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Hawaii 1974); Riger v. 
5u.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art I, § 7. 
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L 8c B Ltd. Partnership, 363 A.2d 481, 487 (Md. 1976). The 
terms of the lease create the expectation that rent will be 
increased only if certain costs increase. Expectations created 
by express or implied contract that fix the duties of the 
respective parties are property interests protected by due 
process. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972). See 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 647 P.2d 
1293, 1297-98 (Utah 1982) (protecting legitimate expectations 
not based on express contract). 
The existence of a utility cost increase is one condition 
precedent to a rent increase. "The utility portion of 
rent . . . may be increased from time to time due to increased 
consumption or higher utility rates charged by 
suppliers. . . • " (R.273). The other condition precedent is 
an increase in debt service, maintenance or operating costs. 
This condition is from the implied incorporation of 
§ 53-38-6 into the lease: 
[A]11 income and revenues derived from the 
operation of the building shall . . . be applied 
solely to the payment of principal and interest 
on the bonds, and . . . to the payment of the 
cost of maintaining and operating the 
building. . . . 
The determination whether these costs have increased, and 
by how much, is the kind of factual decision requiring a due 
process hearing before a rent increase. Thompson v. 
^Controlling statutes are impliedly incorporated into 
leases. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). Section 
53-38-6 is reprinted infra, at app. A-2. 
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Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 638 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Langevin 
v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 300 (2nd Cir. 1971).7 
"Notice and hearing to individuals are fundamental rights when 
government makes factual individual determinations which may 
affect a person's fundamental interests.11 Concerned Parents v. 
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982). Rent increases for 
existing leases is an adjustment of contract rights that is 
traditionally adjudicated by courts. E.g., Anderson v. Section 
11, Inc., 626 P.2d 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Estwin Corp. v. 
Prescription Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc., 563 P.2d 78 (Nev. 1977). 
A rent escalation clause that contains no provision with 
which to calculate the new rent with definiteness is 
unenforceable for being too vague. Pingree v. Continental 
Group, 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). The respondents must 
therefore concede that there is a formula for fixing the new 
rent, thus conceding a protectable property interest; or they 
must claim there are no guidelines, which will void the rent 
increases for indefiniteness. Id. 
A separate but complimentary property interest is the 
benefit of living in low cost housing. When the government 
owns and operates a housing project for the purpose of 
providing low cost housing, the tenants have a property 
interest in keeping the rent low. Thompson v. Washington, 497 
7 The Langevin court found no due process right because there 
was insufficient government involvement to invoke the 
constitution. The same circuit later held that when the 
housing is owned by government, notice and hearing are required 
before rent increases. Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 
479 F.2d 1165 (2nd Cir. 1973). 
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F.2d at 633, 638, 643; Aguiar v. Hawaii Bous. Auth., 522 P.2d 
at 1267; Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165 
(2nd Cir. 1973). The same is true for federally subsidized 
housing, where the tenant is entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to comment before federal authorities approve rent 
increases. Geneva Towers Tenants Org, v. Federated Mortgage 
Inv., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Note, "Procedural Due 
Process in Government-Subsidized Housing,11 86 Harv. L. Rev. 880 
(1973). Contra: Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 
1970) (no property interest because federal housing law was 
intended to induce private investment in housing). Federeal 
regulations now require notice and comment opportunities to 
tenants in subsidized housing. 24 C.F.R. Part 401 (1983). 
The Village is intended to provide low cost housing as an 
inducement to students to attend the University, and as an 
adjunct to the state student financial aids program (R.297). 
Craig relied on the expectation of low cost housing as a 
substantial factor influencing his decision to attend the 
University of Utah (R.317). The operation of government 
institutions so as to create bona fide expectations and 
reliance creates a property interest protected by due process. 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1972). 
Evidence abounds that the legislature expects the Village 
to provide low cost housing. f,The very premise of the program 
is that the rents will be substantially lower than those 
obtainable in the private market; otherwise public housing 
would not be necessary.n Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d at 
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633. There are strict limits on the items rent can be spent 
on. Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-6. The Village is not to operate 
for profit (R.356, 361). The property and operations of the 
Village are exempt from taxation. Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-18. 
The Village was constructed with low interest government bonds, 
a substantial cost savings. These ,fmortgageM payments are 
further reduced by receipt of $473,239 in state land grant 
interest in 1982 alone (R.259); and an annual federal bond 
interest subsidy of $258,952 (R.253). 
Basic maintenance and operating costs per unit should 
theoretically be about the same for similar government and 
private apartments. Thus, the only time rent for government 
housing should even be close to private housing is when the 
economic benefits of government ownership have been squandered 
through profligacy. For example, it is inconceivable that a 
private landlord could make a profit with an $800,000 annual 
payroll (R.253). The legislature did not provide a student 
9 loan program to finance government waste through private 
debt (R.14-15). The lack of oversight by the Board of Regents 
protects and allows uncontrolled administrative expenditures 
(R.360-61, 357-59). Craig has a property interest in rent to 
prevent this kind of abuse of his legitimate expectations of 
^Public housing owned by cities and counties also may not be 
operated for profit or revenue; and rent may be no higher than 
necessary to meet specified expenses. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 55-18-10 (Supp. 1983). 
9utah Code Ann. §§ 53-47-1 and -2; 53-47a-l to -8; 53-47b-l 
to -14 (1953 as amended). 
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low cost housing and prevent the unilateral alteration of his 
lease. 
B. The procedures used to increase rent do not afford due 
process. The procedures required by due process are a matter 
of federal constitutional law, otherwise the state could use 
procedural limitations to virtually destroy state-created 
rights. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 
(1982). See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Common, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) (applying this principle to 
liquor license revocations). The rent increase notification 
procedures in the lease (R.273) are not controlling, nor are 
they substitutes for due process. Aguiar v. Hawaii Hous. 
Auth., 522 P.2d at 1268; Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
425 F.2d 853, 864 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). 
The first prerequisite of due process is the availability 
of a hearing before a citizens1 property rights are affected. 
Notice serves no purpose if there is no provision for hearing 
and evaluating comments. "There must be a full and public 
hearing. There must be evidence sufficient to support the 
necessary findings of fact.11 McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 
Utah 203, 223, 85 P.2d 608, 617 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302-04 (1937). Greater 
formality and procedural regularity are required when a 
university makes determinations of a student's nonacademic 
rights. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89 (1978). 
The rent approval proceedings before the Institutional 
Council is not a hearing. There is no presentation or 
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evaluation of evidence, not even from the University. The 
reasonableness of the existing rent and the necessity of an 
increase are neither determined nor discussed (R.358). A 
list of rental charges prepared by unknown university employees 
is perfunctorily rubber-stamped without public discussion 
(R.266-67). A public meeting whe.re no evidence is taken and 
the administrative body merely accedes to the decision of its 
staff is not the hearing required by due process. McGrew v* 
Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah at 224-25, 85 P.2d at 616-18. 
For these agencies, which necessarily multiply in 
our complex society, to serve the purposes for 
which they are created and endowed with such vast 
power, they must accredit themselves by acting in 
harmony with the inbred concepts of fair play and 
the cherished traditions of a cautious, 
deliberate and judicious determination of the 
questions affecting peoplefs rights or liberties. 
Id., 96 Utah at 225, 85 P.2d at 618. 
Due process also requires the allowance of adequate time to 
prepare to meet the claims of the University. Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1214 (Utah 1983). The University did 
not produce the requested copies of three of the notices for 
the challenged rent increases (R.302). The fourth notice was 
given on April 29, 1983 (R.269), a mere ten days before the May 
9 meeting where rent was increased (R.266). No amount of time 
is enough when the University has a policy of refusing to 
10m nonconstitutional utility rate increase hearings, an 
increase cannot be granted without evidence. Utah Dept. of 
Bus. Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980). A 
rate increase cannot be based on old data to support the 
existing rate. Utah State Bd. of Regents v. Utah Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 583 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1978jT — ~ ~ ~~~~...'.•.: 
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release the financial records on which the increase is based 
(R.354).11 Of course, the notice and hearing must precede 
the rent increase* Aguiar v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 522 P.2d at 
1267. See, Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982 (2nd 
Cir. 1983) (predeprivation hearing required when deprivation is 
pursuant to state policy). 
The notice given must inform the student that he faces a 
final deprivation of property as a result of the hearing 
described in the notice. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 
1213. Craig had no reason to believe the action of the 
Institutional Council was final, assuming he knew about it, 
because the former director of Student Family Housing had told 
him the Board of Regents must approve rent increases before 
they take effect (R.316). An article to the same effect was 
published in the student newspaper; The Daily Utah Chronicle, 
May 11, 1983, at 1, 3. The extent of Craig's confusion was 
shown by the allegations of the Complaint that the board must 
approve rent increases (R.9). The lack of notice that the 
University's action was final violates due process. 
The notices were also fatally defective because they did 
not inform Craig of any alleged opportunity to comment on rent 
increases to any person or in any forum (R.317, 354-55). By 
all appearances and terminology, the notices were final and 
there was no information about a chance to comment (R.269, 
316-17, 356). This does not satisfy due process, even if other 
unsel for respondents correctly noted that these 
documents are public records that must be made available for 
copying (R.332). 
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persons knew of the alleged opportunity to comment. Worrall v. 
Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980); Memphis Light, 
Gas Se Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978). 
Craig's interest in proper procedures is substantial. 
Skyrocketing rent threatens his financial ability to remain in 
school and increases his student loan debt (R.14-15). If he 
challenges a rent increase without paying, he not only faces 
eviction, but the University will hold his registration and 
academic transcript (R.273). There is no choice but to pay or 
be expelled. The transcript hold prevents transfer to another 
university, graduation, and entry into his chosen profession. 
Strict compliance with due process is required when property 
interests are affected that threaten the student's financial 
ability to continue in college. Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 
1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1980). 
The additional cost to the respondents to provide more 
procedure would not be great. The University should already be 
compiling cost analyses and making a presentation to justify 
rent increases, although it is not presently doing this. Thus, 
the University will not have to do much more than is already 
expected for normal administrative decisionmaking. The 
difference will be that the Board of Regents will now have to 
look at both sides instead of none. But the board's staff can 
be used to reduce this load by initially analyzing the comments 
and data. Every agency, city, and county in the state must 
provide public hearings, so the respondents should not seek 
special treatment. Administrative inconvenience is no excuse 
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for ignoring the fundamental right to due process* Ohio Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. at 304-05. 
Due process is a flexible concept. It does not require 
separate oral hearings for each affected student. The exact 
format of the hearing process may need to be developed over 
time. The constitutional minimum was expressed in Burr v. New 
Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d at 1170: 
Notice of a proposed increase in rent shall be 
served well in advance of the date for the 
increase. Opportunity for filing written 
objections shall be given. There need be no 
opportunity for oral presentation. The tenants 
or their representatives shall have the right to 
submit any material they consider relevant to 
disprove the need for the rent increase. 
Finally, the Review Board upon reaching a 
decision shall issue a statement outlining the 
reasons for either approving [,modifying,] or 
rejecting the requested rent increase. The 
tenants may of course be represented by counsel. 
The due process clause and the contract clause in the 
constitution require that a state act only out of necessity and 
with utmost fairness when changing material terms in a 
contract. Procedural regularity is indispensable to safeguard 
the citizen and the sanctity of contract. MIt is procedure 
that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule 
by whim or caprice.n Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
POINT IV 
THE USE OF RENT TO SUPPORT THE UNIVERSITY AND 
MAKE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION. 
The taking of private property for public use without just 
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compensation and the levy of illegal and discriminatory 
taxes on students are prohibited regardless of the procedures 
used. The respondents have built certain charges into the rent 
that are not to cover unique expenses of the Village, but are 
designed to provide revenue for the University. n[A] 
reasonable charge for a specific service is permissible, 
whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue measure is 
not.11 Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982). 
Reasonableness is not ordinarily determined by summary 
judgment. Id. However, the charges at issue here are so 
inherently inequitable that they are unreasonable per se. Id. 
In addition, the charges are not for specific services but for 
general governmental duties. 
Although Craig was not allowed any discovery, he was able 
to identify the following payments: (1) using rent to 
subsidize other facilities in the Student Housing Bond System 
(R.12, HIT 37, 38); (2) using rent to finance a second 
maintenance facility at the Village (R.359); (3) surplus 
utilities charges are given to the University (R.358); 
(4) interest earned from rent deposited in the bank is taken by 
the University (R.351); (5) direct charges for University 
administrative expenses (B..8, 11-12, 22); (6) surplus rent not 
spent on capital improvements is given to the University 
(R-354). 
12|fprivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation.11 Utah Const, art. I, § 22. 
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A. These forfeitures and fees are unconstsitutional takings 
for general government revenues. The University's powers to 
use funds in its care are strictly limited by statute. First 
Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); 
University of Utah v. Bd. of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 439-40, 
295 P.2d 348, 369-70 (1956). As state agencies, the 
respondents have no power to tax anybody to raise revenue. 
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 
231-32, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935). Accordingly, the Village is 
not to be operated for profit or as a revenue source (R.356, 
361). 
The power to charge rent must be narrowly construed to 
extend only to payment for the cost of benefits not shared by 
other members of society. National Cable Tel. Ass'n v. United 
States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974). Abroad interpretation 
creates constitutional problems as a delegation of taxing 
power. Id. at 342-43. Without legal limits--imposed by 
statute or constitution--rent could be used to evade budgetary 
restrictions and accountability for expenditures. A strict 
construction of the rent power is compelled by § 53-38-6, which 
requires rent to be "applied solely to the payment of principal 
and of interest on the bonds, and . . . to the payment of the 
cost of maintaining and operating the building.11 (Emphasis 
added.) An agency cannot use its rules to create fees that are 
13As to the complete lack of accountability under the present 
system, see R.357, 11 13; 358-61. 
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not established by statute. Utah Mfrs. Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 
Utah 198, 215, 23 P.2d 229, 236 (1933). 
Certain factors for a void fee may be gleaned from the 
cases. The fee must have some relationship to the need for 
services created by the activities of the payor. Call v. City 
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979). It must pay for 
a specific benefit provided to the payor that is "not shared by 
other members of society.,f National Cable Television Ass'n, 
415 U.S. at 341; Cache County v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 227, 61 
P. 303, 308 (1900). The recipient of a unit of service must be 
identifiable apart from the general public. FPC v. New England 
Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974). All citizens who share 
in the benfit of the service must pay their fair share of the 
cost. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1982). 
If these factors are minimal or merely incidental, and the 
money is used primarily as revenue for general university 
purposes, it is a "tax" regardless of the actual label used to 
describe it. Weber Basin Home Builders Assfn v. Roy City, 26 
Utah 2d 215, 217, 487 P.2d 866, 867 (1971). 
The automatic forfeiture of unspent rent and utilities 
payments to the University at the end of each fiscal year is 
obviously not a charge for a service. This windfall to the 
University is prohibited because the Village cannot be a 
revenue source. This policy is the motivation for many 
unnecessary expenditures by the Village (R.354, 1T 6), which 
must be stopped if the Village is ever going to be run in an 
economical manner to provide low cost housing. For the same 
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reasons, there is no legal justification for the Village to 
subsidize revenue shortfalls for other campus enterprises. 
The University also makes a direct charge for police, fire, 
public relations, personnel services and other administrative 
activities of the University (R.8, 11-12 (allegations admitted 
in Answer, 22)). This charge is in addition to the 
administrative costs of the Village, which are a part of the 
Village operating budget (R.253). These University-wide 
services are already paid for from taxes and general student 
fees other than rent {R.8, 12 IT 35, 22). 
Salt Lake City is already obligated to provide police and 
fire protection to all residents of the city, so the Village is 
not receiving a special benefit that is otherwise unavailable 
to the public. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-7-1; 10-6-61 (1953 as 
amended). These services are the inherent sovereign duties of 
government, not a special service uniquely required by the 
Village. Salt Lake City v. International Assfn of 
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1977). The legislature 
has not authorized the imposition of fees on students to pay 
for essential governmental services already paid for from other 
sources, so these fees are void. 
Rent is collected to pay bond debt, utility, maintenance, 
and operating costs of the Village. "If money is collected 
from the public for a specified purpose, it becomes a trust 
fund committed to the carrying out of that purpose.11 Call v« 
City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d at 200. Once the trust purpose 
is fulfilled for each fiscal year, the surplus should be 
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refunded under the principles of constructive trust. It cannot 
be used as general revenue. Id. In Bishop v. J.E. Crofts 8c 
Sons., 545 P.2d 520 (Utah 1976), surplus insurance premiums and 
dividends earned by a nonprofit corporation that purchased 
insurance for its members was refunded under constructive 
trust. In Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976), rents 
and profits earned by a real estate agent before the sale of 
property were held in constructive trust for the seller. 
A constructive trust is imposed on money paid to another 
for a specified purpose in order to prevent fraud and unjust 
enrichment. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229 
(1949). It is unjust enrichment for the University to keep the 
surplus because the Village is not supposed to be a revenue 
source. Cf* Bishop v. J.E. Crofts 8c Sons, where a nonprofit 
corporation was a constructive trustee. In Texas Eastern 
Transfn Corp. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970), a gas company was required to 
refund excess revenue to consumers because utilities regulation 
was intended to provide low cost gas, and a refund would 
further that purpose. It is also fraudulent for the University 
to use coercive state power--the threat of expulsion from 
college and eviction--to collect excessive rent for phantom 
expenses when it intends to keep the economic benefit of the 
surplus. 
Because rent is a trust fund, so is the interest earned on 
rent deposited in the bank. Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake 
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Utah 1983) (interest on taxes 
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collected for school districts). All of the profit a trustee 
earns on the trust funds must be paid over with the refund, or 
at least used for trust purposes. Bishop v. J.E. Crofts & 
Sons, 545 P.2d at 524. 
?• The use of rent for capital improvements and new 
construction is an illegal tax. Craig is not obligated under 
the lease to pay for capital improvements to University 
property. In 1982, the Village spent at least $550,070 for 
such capital improvements as new asphalt and concrete, roof 
replacements, peripheral lighting, and secondary electrical 
upgrade (R.260). It also spent $366,000 for construction 
of a new maintenance building. These expenses were paid from 
rent. 
The term "maintenance11 in § 53-38-6, as incorporated into 
the lease, has a definite meaning in landlord tenant law. It 
means "to keep in a particular state or condition, especially 
with reference to efficiency; to support, to sustain, to keep 
up; not to suffer to fail or decline.11 Mid-Continent Life Ins. 
Co. v. Henry's, Inc., 520 P.2d 1319, 1324-25 (Kan. 1974). This 
definition excludes major structural repairs that survive the 
term of the lease and are not necessary because of a special 
use of the premises by the tenant. Id. When structural 
repairs are necessary to comply with building codes, the 
landlord, not the tenant, must pay for the repair. Wolfe v. 
l^The University owns the exterior electrical distribution 
system in the Village. In buying electricity from Utah Power Sc 
Light Co. for resale at the Village, it is operating as an 
unregulated electric utility (R.357). 
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White, 114 Utah 39, 197 P.2d 125 (1948) (roof replacement); 
Pingree v. Continental Group, 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976) (fire 
escape)• 
If the landlord voluntarily undertakes improvements not 
required by law, he must still pay for them. Glenn R. Sewell 
Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 451 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1969). It is 
unjust enrichment to require tenants who happen to live in the 
Village in a given year to pay for capital improvements that 
primarily benefit the state's reversionary interest. See 
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 521, 543-48 (1968) (primary benefit to the 
landlord's reversionary interest is a major factor in deciding 
who pays for major repairs). In the lease at issue here, the 
University unambiguously assumed financial responsibility for 
all repairs and renovations (R.274). It is a breach of the 
lease to try to shift these costs to Craig. 
Unlike cases involving sewer connection fees and similar 
fees for municipal improvements, the person who pays, the 
tenant, receives no benefits to his real property. So long as 
the University continues to make massive cash investments in 
capital improvements, there is no way to equitably spread the 
cost among present and future beneficiaries, as required by the 
lease and the constitution. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 
376, 379 (Utah 1982); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). 
The legislature has provided a way to equitably finance new 
construction and capital improvements. These methods are 
appropriations, revenue bonds, contracts with the United 
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States, long term contracts and loans* Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 53-38-2 to -16 (1953 as amended). All of these methods 
spread the cost over the entire group of tenants who will 
supposedly benefit. Rather than use these methods, the 
University uses rent directly for cash payments, or it uses 
surplus cash in the bond account, as it did with the second 
maintenance building (R.220). Either way, the money comes from 
rent (R.359, 183-90). 
The respondents do not have the power to use their rules to 
create new ways to finance capital improvements. The 
legislative listing of approved methods impliedly excludes the 
use of unlisted methods; just as the listing of authorized 
investments impliedly excluded unlisted investments in First 
Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d at 892. General 
sections of the statutes are construed no more broadly than 
provisions that specifically treat the same subject. In re 
Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah 
1983). Thus, wherever the respondent's claim to derive 
authority to avoid statutory limitations on financing, it 
cannot be construed to extend to a subject already specifically 
covered. 
C. The present procedures for approving capital improvements 
are unlawful. The Board of Regents is required to "approve or 
disapprove all new construction, repair, rehabilitation, or 
purchase of educational and general buildings and facilities 
financed from any source at all institutions subject to the 
jurisdiction of the board. . . .n Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-17 
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(1953 as amended) (reprinted in Appendix). The board did not 
approve the construction of the maintenance building, nor has 
it authorized any of the other capital improvements at the 
Village since it abdicated its duties in 1980 (R.361). These 
expenditures are void because the board is the only authority 
having power to construct or remodel buildings on behalf of the 
University. Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-38-1(1), 53-48-16 (1953 as 
amended) (reprinted in the Appendix). 
The respondents claim that their rules allow rent to be 
used to finance new construction without prior approval by the 
Board of Regents (R.117-19). Contrary to the Board's rule, the 
law says that approval must be given regardless of the source 
of financing. !,The rules adopted by an administrative agency 
are not binding on the courts and an 'administrative 
interpretation out of harmony and contrary to the express 
provisions of a statute cannot be given weight.1" West Jordan 
v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 1982) (quoting Utah Hotel 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 32, 151 P.2d 467, 471 
(1944)). A clear and unambiguous statute is enforced as 
written. 
With the maintenance building, the University also evaded 
restrictions on accepting bids exceeding the estimated cost of 
the project. Bids cannot be accepted if the lowest bid exceeds 
the cost estimate by more than 5%. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-56-21(7) (Supp. 1983). "Competitive sealed bidding is 
unsuccessful when all bids . . . are unreasonable, 
noncompetitive, or the low bid exceeds available funds as 
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certified by the appropriate fiscal officer.11 Utah State Bldg. 
Bd. Regs, for the Procurement of Constr. and Prof. Serv., 
§ VE(2) (1980). The lowest bid exceeded the estimated cost by 
$35,700, or 12.3% (R.93). This high bid was not approved by 
the Institutional Council until June 13, 1983 (R.244 (the date 
is in the far upper right-hand corner)); nearly one month after 
the contract was signed (R.86). The last rent increase was 
decided on the same day the University accepted the 
budget-busting bid (R.92, 269). 
In summary, the University has been acting without 
restraint or authority in purchasing capital improvements and 
new construction with rent. These are not legitimate 
maintenance costs and are contrary to the lease. The state's 
reversionary interest benefits much more than a tenant's 
leasehold. The respondents must use approved financing methods 
to spread the cost equitably. Furthermore, the Village is 
being operated contrary to the respondents' own rules as a 
source of revenue for general University administrative 
expenses. These actions violate substantive due process and 
the rational basis level of equal protection analysis. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING CRAIG'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court refused to hear argument on Craig's second 
motion for partial summary judgment because he felt that the 
earlier ruling had disposed of the case (R.384-89)• Instead, 
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he sua sponte struck the motion (R.365). The case was 
still pending because the prior minute entry had not been 
reduced to judgment. New evidence in the form of admissions 
and affidavits was submitted. A motion for summary judgment is 
nearly always relevant, so it should have been granted or 
denied, not stricken. If a motion for summary judgment 
presents the case in a different light because of new evidence 
or the like, a prior ruling may be reexamined if the case is 
still pending. Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 
1033. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING CRAIG AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCOVERY. 
Craig filed an affidavit and motion for a continuance of 
the respondents1 motions for summary judgment because they had 
not responded to his discovery requests and he had no evidence 
to challenge the supporting affidavits (R.317, 314, 325). The 
requests for admission and requests for the production of 
documents are specific and detailed in listing the needed 
evidence, which was in sole possession of the respondents. 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
l^The respondents filed a motion to strike this motion on the 
day of the hearing (R.366). This motion could not have been 
granted, even if the judge knew about it, without at least five 
days notice. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d). 
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the application for judgment. . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
The discovery requests were filed only ten days after Craig 
received the respondents' motions wherein, for the first time, 
he learned which points the respondents would contest. This, 
too, after the respondents had twice delayed a hearing on 
Craig's motion for two months just so they could file their 
motions for summary judgment. Where the party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment had no prior knowledge of facts 
presented by affidavit in support of the motion, and the movant 
has exclusive possession of necessary evidence, it is an abuse 
of discretion to refuse a continuance. Auerbach's v. Kimball, 
572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977); Strand v. Associated Students of 
the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
Summary judgment is not a penalty for not conducting 
discovery on the timetable set by the opposing party. It is 
improper to consider the materials submitted in support of a 
motion for summary judgment when the opposing party has not had 
discovery to permit impeachment of the supporting affidavits. 
Miller v. Alexander, 25 Fed. R. Serv.2d 1040 (D.D.C. 1975). 
Every inference that would indicate the existence of a 
material issue of fact should be given to the party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 
434 (Utah 1982). It is impossible for the judge to have known 
the factual basis for Craig's claim and what the challenged 
policies, practices, and procedures are without discovery. The 
refusal to allow discovery until after a motion to dismiss is 
heard may cause unfair prejudice to the non-moving party. 
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Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1979)- It was 
therefore reversible error to grant summary judgment against 
Craig without an opportunity for discovery. In addition, the 
materials presented in support of the motion ignored argument 
on the constitutional issues (R.321, 312-14), and were 
inadequate to show that the respondents were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than being ruled by law, the Village is ruled by 
fiat. Like the feudal lords of old, the rulers of the Village 
operate free of restraint or oversight. They do not feel 
constrained to follow the most direct commands of the 
legislature. They are more likely to change their contract 
than honor it (R.276 §§ 12(a), 15; 337-38). Such is the result 
when the lead agency abdicates all responsibility and 
frustrates a carefully designed system of checks and balances. 
This would always be the case were it not for the state and 
federal constitutions, wherein procedure is the protector of 
the disadvantaged. 
Craig is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
respondents1 policies and procedures in setting and spending 
rent deny procedural and substantive due process. Craig is 
entitled to restitution of all rent that was unlawfully taken 
and spent. He is also entitled to the costs of this appeal and 
the cost of printing the brief. Utah R. Civ. P. 75(p)(5). As 
an action jointly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and the 
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state declaratory judgment statute, costs are awardable to the 
prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V. 1981); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-33-10 (1953 as amended). A remand is necessary to 
calculate the amount of restitution to be paid. 
Respectfully submitted this M day of January, 1984. 
M 
Craig J. Reece^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January / / , 1984, I hand-delivered 
four copies of this brief to Douglas C. Richards and Bill L. 
Walker, Assistant Attorneys General, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
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APPENDIX 
All references to Utah Code Ann. (1981). 
53-38-1. Powers of state board--Projects 
and buildings. The state board of higher 
education on behalf of the University of Utah, 
the College of Eastern Utah, Utah State 
University of Agriculture and Applied Science, 
Snow College, Weber State College, Southern Utah 
State College, Dixie College, and the Utah 
Technical Colleges at Salt Lake and Provo (all 
being state institutions of higher learning) is 
authorized and empowered on behalf of such 
institutions: 
(1) To acquire, purchase, construct, 
improve, remodel, add to, and extend 
self-liquidating projects, revenue-producing 
buildings, and all other projects and facilities 
including, but not limited to: classrooms and 
other instructional facilities; laboratory 
facilities and buildings for the conduct of 
research and development; libraries and study 
facilities; continuing education conference 
centers; administrative and office facilities, 
including computers and data processing 
equipment; museums; necessary and related 
utilities; dormitories and other suitable living 
quarters or accommodations; dining halls, 
kitchens, and other food service and preparation 
facilities; student union buildings for student 
services and activity facilities and bookstores; 
physical education, athletic facilities, 
fieldhouses, stadiums, and gymnasiums; theaters, 
auditoriums, parking lots, and parking 
structures; storage and maintenance facilities; 
and infirmaries, hospitals, and medical and 
health facilities. . . . 
(4) To equip, furnish, maintain and operate 
such projects and buildings. For the use and 
availability of the foregoing, the board may 
impose and collect rents, fees, and charges from 
students, faculty members, and other persons, 
firms, and corporations, both public and 
private. As used in this chapter, "projects11 and 
"buildings11 include any one or more of such 
facilities. 
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53-38-6. Disposition and use of income 
derived from operation of buildings--Payment of 
principal and interest of bonds* That except as 
to revenues paid directly to a trustee under the 
provisions of subsection (6) of section 53-38-3 
hereof, all income and revenues derived from the 
operation of the building shall be deposited as 
collected in a fund in a bank or trust company 
approved as a regular depository by the state 
depository board, to be applied solely to the 
payment of the principal of and interest on the 
bonds, and, to the extent so provided in the 
resolution authorizing the bonds, to the payment 
of the cost of maintaining and operating the 
building and the establishment of reserves for 
such purposes. As principal and interest become 
due from time to time, the treasurer of the 
board, or such other fiscal officer of the 
institution as may be designated by resolution of 
the board, shall, not less than fifteen days 
prior to the payment date, transmit to the paying 
agent for the bonds, money from said fund in an 
amount sufficient to pay the principal or 
interest so falling due. Said funds and the 
money therein is irrevocably pledged to such 
purposes. 
53-48-16. Property of institutions to vest 
in board. The board shall succeed to and be 
vested with all the powers and authority relating 
to all properties, real and personal, tangible 
and intangible and to the control and management 
thereof which was held by the governing board of 
each institution prior to the effective date of 
this act. 
53-48-17. Buildings and facilities—Board 
to approve all construction and purchases. TEe 
board shall approve or disapprove all new 
constsruction, repair and rehabilitation or 
purchase of educational and general buildings and 
facilities financed from any source at all 
institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the 
board. No institution shall submit plans or 
specifications to the state building board for 
the construction or alteration of buildings, 
structures or racilities or for the purchases of 
equipment of fixtures therefor without the 
authorization and approval of the board. 
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R. Prac. Dist. 8c Cir. Courts 
Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for 
the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time 
* as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity 
with the rulings 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, 
Judgments, and/or Orders shall be served on 
opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five 
(5) days after service. 
State Court Jurisdiction Over a Federal Civil Rights Claim 
This action was filed jointly under the state declaratory 
judgment statute and the federal civil rights statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp, V 1981). Neither the respondents nor the 
trial court challenged jurisdiction. State courts may accept 
jurisdiction of a claim under § 1983, but the United States 
Supreme Court has reserved the question whether states are 
obligated to do so. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.l 
(1980). 
Section 1983 provides: 
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights. 
Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this 
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section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
Several states have accepted jurisdiction of suits under 
this section* The propriety of their doing so was noted in 
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980): 
We note that the California courts accepted 
jurisdiction of this federal claim. That 
exercise of jurisdiction appears to be consistent 
with the general rule that where 
,!fan act of Congress gives a penalty to a party 
aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its 
enforcement, there is no reason why it should not 
be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some 
act of Congress, by a proper action in a State 
court.111 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391, 
quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137. 
See also Aldinger v. HowafoT, 427 U.S. 1, 36, n.17 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Grubb v. Public 
Utilities Commfn, 281 U.S. 470, 476. WeHETave 
never considered, however, the question whether a 
State must entertain a claim under § 1983. We 
note that where the same type of claim, if 
arising under state law, would be enforced in the 
state courts, the state courts are generally not 
free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim. 
Testa v. Katt, supra, at 394. But see 
Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 S.W.2d 
248 (1%9). 
As this citation makes clear, state and federal courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the federal and respective 
state constitutions. See Young v. Board of Educ, 416 F. Supp. 
1139 (D. Colo. 1976), and Brown v. Pitchess, 531 P.2d 772 (Cal. 
1975) , for ample citations and reasoning for allowing § 1983 
actions in state courts. 
State district courts have jurisdiction over all civil 
matters unless specifically excepted by statute. Utah Const. 
art. VIII, § 7; Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, 92 Utah 148, 59 P.2d 935 
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(1936). This would logically include federal causes of 
action. Section 1983 does not create new rights, it is a 
procedural mechanism for protecting existing rights. Chapman 
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979). 
State law provides the rule of decision in § 1983 cases unless 
it is inconsistent with the federal constitution. Board of 
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Espinoza v. O'Dell, 
633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981). It would seem logical and more 
efficient for a state court to resolve important questions of 
state law, such as are presented in this case, instead of 
forcing a plaintiff into federal court. 
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